

4470
Top Secret

POLAND: Leadership Differences

The ruling Military Council may be more unified than the Politburo. There are reports of increasing popular irritation in several areas.

A reliable source [redacted] reports that only minor differences exist within the Military Council of National Salvation between Premier Jaruzelski and other nationalistic Poles, and those more responsive to the Soviets. The source implied that the Council is generally more conservative than the party leadership and claimed that it would proceed with the destruction of Solidarity and perhaps the removal of party liberals.

The source asserted that the Politburo can be divided into liberal, moderate, and hardline groups. He also stated that the liberals and the moderates have a slim majority.

Comment: The Military Council probably is more unified than the party leadership, a factor that helps it maintain control. The Council, however, may not be as homogenous as the source maintains.

Although greater unity within the Council would seem to give it an advantage in establishing long-term policies, Poland's military leaders have been trained to defer to the party and may still do so despite their unhappiness with mistakes made by the party since August 1980. If the Politburo is deadlocked on setting policies, the Council may feel compelled to take the lead. This would give Jaruzelski considerable leeway in setting policy.

Signs of Restiveness

[redacted] there are signs that people are beginning to express their feelings of anger. In Krakow, [redacted] one priest

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1
Top Secret

23 January 1982

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~~Top Secret~~

believes the overall situation in the steel town of Nowa Huta--as in neighboring Silesia--is building up to an "explosion."

Comment: These reports, which are based on observations by local sources, jibe with public and private concerns Church leaders have voiced about the possibility of violence. Such dissatisfaction also may sharpen disputes between those in the regime who favor easing some martial law restrictions as a way of lessening tensions and those who argue that strict controls are the only way of maintaining order.

Economic Strains

Wieslaw Gornicki, a close adviser to Jaruzelski, recently told Hungarian radio that he fears spontaneous protests to the price increases planned for February. He blamed Western sanctions for the deterioration in the economy over the past two weeks. Another Polish official stated on Thursday that Western sanctions are prompting Poland to reduce its economic dependence on the West and to expand trade with Communist and developing countries.

Comment: Gornicki's statement is the first public admission of the regime's concern about public reaction to price hikes. His remarks probably are part of an effort to encourage increased aid from CEMA countries.

Government attempts to blame sanctions for current problems seems to exaggerate their impact. Current shortages probably stem more from import cutbacks in late 1981 and the virtual halt of commerce during the early stages of martial law. Sanctions will have a greater impact in coming months.

Discrediting Walesa

An anonymous pamphlet mailed from Paris to an official of the International Labor Organization in Geneva alleges that Solidarity leader Walesa is a "longtime

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~~Top Secret~~

23 January 1982

~~Top Secret~~

police spy" who deliberately sabotaged the anti-Communist workers' movement in Poland. [REDACTED] attributes the pamphlet to Soviet disinformation efforts in Western Europe. [REDACTED]

Comment: The pamphlet could represent an effort by Soviet or Polish authorities to sow confusion among Solidarity's supporters in the West and, as word filters back, in Poland as well. The document probably will not have much impact, but the effort could indicate that Soviet and Polish authorities are losing hope that Walesa can be persuaded to associate himself with the martial law regime's policies. [REDACTED]

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23 January 1982